Book Review: An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory

An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory by Alasdair Cochrane
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Summary

My goals in reading this book were twofold. First, I wanted to strengthen my understanding of the major schools of thought in contemporary political theory. Second, I wanted to educate myself on the so-called "political turn" in animal ethics: the broadening of questions about our obligations towards animals to include questions about political institutions. Cochrane's excellently written book helped me to achieve these two goals. Having read this book, I now feel prepared to dive into more detailed discussions about animals and political theory. I recommend it as a great starting point and reference for anyone who shares these two goals.

Cochrane begins the book by highlighting the importance of the animal question in political theory: how ought political communities treat animals? Political communities must take some position on this question since human-animal interaction is ubiquitous. Indeed, political communities do take positions by enacting or (more often) failing to enact laws governing the treatment of animals, by including or (more often) failing to include animal interests within the analysis of policies, and so on. Despite this practical necessity, however, contemporary political theory has almost exclusively discussed the question of how political communities ought to be structured by thinking about humans, at best discussing animals as an aside. In particular, questions of justice—questions concerning what political communities owe to animals as a matter of necessity, deserving the force of law—have been largely ignored. This oversight reveals an implicit endorsement of the prevailing idea that animals have no place in the realm of political justice. Perhaps we as individuals have obligations to animals, but it is not appropriate for the state to have such obligations.

One might wonder, however, why this should be. If we are convinced that animals matter morally (as we should be, given the force of arguments in the animal ethics literature), why exactly should obligations towards animals be relegated to the realm of private morality? If we cannot find a good reason to exclude animals from the realm of political justice, then we are forced to think more deeply about how to accommodate animals within our political systems.

In the main part of the book, Cochrane gives a general sketch of various schools of thought in contemporary political theory and then assesses how successfully these schools of thought can account for the moral importance of animals. He is largely critical of communitarian, Marxist, and feminist attempts to give animals their due. Cochrane maintains that these frameworks grant too much importance to our particular societal values, economic systems, and sentimental attachments, respectively. Because these frameworks rest political justice for animals on shaky foundations and tendentious connections, they threaten to undermine attempts to give animals their due.

Instead, Cochrane comes down in favor of a synthesis between utilitarianism and liberalism. He sees these two major traditions as being conceptual duals: the former prizes the general good, the latter, the individual; the former emphasizes sentience, the latter, personhood. In turn, Cochrane thinks that the best way forward to accommodate animals within the realm of political justice is to adopt a blend of the two traditions, taking the best from each. The result is a political theory that prioritizes individual rights but grounds such rights in the protection of interests, components of wellbeing. Since sentient animals can have interests, it follows that they can have rights, and thus they can be given their due by political institutions.

Despite ultimately coming down in favor of these two traditions, Cochrane is willing to recognize particular communitarian, Marxist, and feminist insights. The communitarian is right to point out the need to view the individual as situated within a larger social environment since this has consequences both for how individuals can live flourishing lives, and for how we can create change. Indeed, the Marxist is right to point out that sometimes this larger social environment requires radical upheaval. For instance, the mere enactment of legal rights for animals does not guarantee them political justice unless accompanied by a larger shift in public opinion. Otherwise, these laws will be purely symbolic, having no impact in the real world. Likewise, the feminist is right to point out the limits of reason and the value of sentiment in creating change in the real world. People are indeed moved by the plight of animals, and while these emotions cannot provide adequate foundations for the content of justice, they can likely help us get there.

Analysis

Cochrane does a good job of evaluating these various traditions in political theory. His analysis of utilitarianism covers the typical issues that readers are likely familiar with. The later chapters on liberalism, communitarianism, Marxism, and feminism were very valuable. In particular, I found many novel insights in his discussion of liberalism.

Cochrane points out that liberalism is defined both by its methodology and by its ideals. Liberalism provides a conception of political justice centered around the free and equal individual. But this valuation of the individual must be reconciled with the question of political authority: how can a state be legitimate if it restricts the individual? The traditional response within the liberal tradition has been an appeal to the normative force of social contracts. The terms of a contract have authority over each party because these terms are the product of each individual's will. Likewise, the laws and institutions of a political community have authority over each citizen because they are (or would be) accepted by individuals joining together in creating a social contract. This methodology (known as "social contract theory") has been employed to determine the particular contents of political justice within a liberal framework, most famously by John Rawls.

To determine the contents of political justice within a liberal framework, Rawls asks us to imagine ourselves as contractors behind a veil of ignorance: we know nothing about our particular features, including our race, gender, and particular values embodied in a conception of the good. These particular features are morally arbitrary under a liberal framework, so removing them ensures that we enter the contract as free and equal participants, just as liberalism would require. This process is supposed to lead rational agents—primarily looking out for their own well-being but unaware of what exact position they will occupy within society—to select fair principles for evaluating and constructing basic political institutions. Since we are committed to the liberal values of freedom and equality, it is supposed to follow that these principles of justice are binding for us in the real world, too.

However, Rawls' version of social contract methodology has been criticized for failing to incorporate animals within the realm of political justice. If the contents of political justice within a liberal framework are supposed to be determined by the decisions of humans, then we will inevitably end up with an anthropocentric society. In response to this failure to incorporate animals, several authors (including Mark Rowlands) have argued that Rawls neglects to remove another piece of morally arbitrary information from us: namely, our species. Once we realize that we might end up being a member of an oppressed species, we will include animals within our conception of political justice.

Cochrane, however, shows that this is not an effective strategy. Drawing on Robert Garner's work, he points out that an appeal to the veil of ignorance is bound to fail because the Rawlsian approach is fundamentally conservative. Because Rawls relies on a general methodology of reflective equilibrium—according to which abstract principles and concrete intuitions are supposed to influence one another in a search for ultimate coherence—we end up with a problem of "garbage in, garbage out!" Reflective equilibrium allows Rawls to grant us information about our own species because he comes into the thought experiment with a prior conception of fairness, according to which species isn't a morally arbitrary feature. Thus, object-level disagreements about the place of animals in morality must be resolved before we can employ the veil of ignorance in an attempt to include animals within a conception of political justice.

I found this discussion enlightening. The social contract approach is appealing because of its ability to simultaneously answer two fundamental questions: what should the rules of a political system look like, and why should we follow them? The rules are determined by what agents like us would agree to in a hypothetical contracting position, and we should follow them because agents like us would create the contract. Thus political obligation is autonomous in the sense that it comes from the individual's will rather than some external authority. However, the foregoing discussion suggests that social contract theory may not adequately determine the contents of political justice. Since obligations towards animals must factor into political justice, perhaps instead of asking about what agents like us would agree to, as a matter of fact, we should instead ask about what agents like us would agree to while remaining consistent with our deepest moral values. This would allow us to include animals within the realm of political justice while at the same time locating the source of political authority within the individual will—a conclusion that treats animals properly without neglecting essential aspects of humanity.